題 目：CEO Compensation and Covenant Violations
主講人：Xian Sun博士 美國霍普金斯大學(xué)
時 間：2011年6月27日 下午2:00
地 點：主樓309會議室
主講人簡介：
Xian Sun, PhD (Finance, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) joined the Johns Hopkins Carey Business School in 2009. She is an Assistant Professor in the research track with expertise in the areas of emerging capital markets, institutional shareholders, and mergers and acquisitions. Honors and Distinctions. She received the On-The-Spot Awards, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, September 2007, December 2007, August 2008, and Del and Edith Karger Dissertation Prize in Management, RPI, May 2006.
內(nèi)容簡介：
Although covenant violations are common and have significant negative consequences for firm value, little is known about why firms violate covenants, especially from manager’s incentive perspective. This study examines the relationship between CEO compensation and covenant violations. Consistent with the risk-shift hypothesis developed by Carlson and Lazrak (2010), we find that firms with CEOs whose salaries constitute a higher proportion of their total compensation are more likely to violate covenants. Those CEOs also actively change their pay structure prior to a violation so as to reduce their wealth exposure to a negative event by increasing their salaries even higher and/or reducing their share ownership. The results suggest that the likelihood of a future violation increases by 13.6% for every percentage-point increase in salary as a proportion of total compensation and by 4.9% when the salary portion increases by 1% in the year of violation.
（承辦：應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟系）
