題 目：Study on the Group-buying auction
主講人：陳劍教授 清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟偉德國際1946bv官網(wǎng)
時 間：2011年12月23日(周五) 下午15：30
地 點：主樓241會議室
主講人簡介:
清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟偉德國際1946bv官網(wǎng)管理科學(xué)與工程系聯(lián)想講席教授（Lenovo Chair Professor）、博士生導(dǎo)師，清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟偉德國際1946bv官網(wǎng)管理科學(xué)與工程系系主任, 教育部人文社會科學(xué)重點研究基地——清華大學(xué)現(xiàn)代管理研究中心主任。于1983年獲得清華大學(xué)電機系學(xué)士學(xué)位，1986年獲得清華大學(xué)自動化系碩士學(xué)位，1989年獲得清華經(jīng)濟偉德國際1946bv官網(wǎng)博士學(xué)位。主要研究領(lǐng)域為供應(yīng)鏈管理、電子商務(wù)、商務(wù)智能與決策分析、系統(tǒng)優(yōu)化與預(yù)測技術(shù)等。講授課程包括動態(tài)系統(tǒng)分析與控制、決策理論、運作管理、供應(yīng)鏈管理等。
陳劍教授作為作者/合作者在《Annals of Operations Research》，《IEEE Transaction on System, man and Cybernetics—Part A: systems and human》，《IIE Transactions》，《Information Science》，《International Journal of Production Economics》，《Naval Research Logistics》，《Operations Research Letters》，《Production and Operations Management》，《系統(tǒng)工程理論與實踐》、《管理科學(xué)學(xué)報》等國際國內(nèi)學(xué)術(shù)期刊上發(fā)表論文一百七十多篇；主持近二十個國家自然科學(xué)基金委、教育部、863等國家部委項目，以及近20個地方政府/企業(yè)委托項目。應(yīng)邀在多個國際會議上做大會報告（Keynote/Plenary Lecture）。陳劍教授獲得過多項科技獎勵及榮譽稱號，如教育部科技進步獎/自然科學(xué)獎/人文社會科學(xué)獎；國際電氣和電子工程師協(xié)會（IEEE）會士；IBM學(xué)院獎；教育部長江學(xué)者；復(fù)旦管理學(xué)獎；全國優(yōu)秀博士學(xué)位論文指導(dǎo)教師；北京市政府科學(xué)技術(shù)進步獎；中國青年科技獎等。
陳劍教授在多個學(xué)術(shù)組織中任職，如擔(dān)任生產(chǎn)和運營管理學(xué)會（POMS）副理事長（負責(zé)亞太區(qū)），IEEE系統(tǒng)、人與控制論學(xué)會服務(wù)系統(tǒng)和組織專業(yè)委員會主席，IEEE SMC北京分會主席，中國系統(tǒng)工程學(xué)會副理事長，中國優(yōu)選法統(tǒng)籌法與經(jīng)濟數(shù)學(xué)研究會副理事長，中國信息協(xié)會常務(wù)理事，國家自然科學(xué)基金會管理科學(xué)部專家委員會委員、工商管理組副組長等，也是眾多國際會議的主席/共同主席，同時擔(dān)任多個國際學(xué)術(shù)雜志（如：Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering、Electronic Commerce Research and Applications、IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics、Flexible Services and Manufacturing、International Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making、 Systems Research and Behavioral Science等）的編輯或編委。
內(nèi)容簡介：
With the development of electronic commerce, online auction plays an important role in the electronic market. The group-buying auction (GBA) is a new kind of dynamic pricing mechanism on the Internet. It makes the bidders as a group through Internet to get the volume discounts, i.e., the more bidders bid, the lower the price of the object being auctioned becomes. In this talk, we first analyze the group-buying auction under some assumptions and build an incomplete information dynamic game model to illustrate the bidders’ bidding process. It proves that for the bidders there exists a weakly dominant strategy S, i.e., no matter when a bidder arrives at the auction and what the bidding history is, the highest permitted bid price that is no greater than his value to the object is always his optimal bid price, but may not be the unique one. Then, we analyze the seller's pricing strategy with the GBA. Based on the bidders' optimal strategy, the sellers' optimal price curve of the GBA in the uniform unit cost case and in some supply chain coordination contracts are explored. We find that the best discount rate is zero, which implies the optimal GBA is equivalent to the optimal fixed pricing mechanism (FPM). Furthermore, we compare the GBA with the FPM in two special cases, the economies of scale and risk-seeking seller, and find that in both cases the GBA outperforms the FPM. The collusion of bidders in traditional auctions is generally forbidden because it is harmful to the interests of sellers. However, we find that collusion in the GBA results in higher bidding, leading to market expansion that benefits both bidders and sellers. Finally, we extend our study to B2B commerce, i.e., consider a supply chain with one supplier and several retailers in their respective independent market, where the supplier offers a new pricing mechanism based on the GBA. An equilibrium is presented.
